The issue of same-sex marriage legalization is increasingly part of the national political dialogue. This legalization would have a number of economic impacts, one of the most direct being a change in income tax payments, through the so-called marriage penalty. I estimate the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on federal income tax revenue. These estimates rely critically on the responsiveness of labor supply and marital choice to changes in the tax code. I present new evidence on both topics using changes in taxation generated from the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. In addition, I propose a novel measure of the marriage penalty that incorporates the fact that agents will respond optimally to changes in marginal tax rates within the household.
Introduction
The debate over whether same-sex couples should be allowed the legal right to marry has become a hot-button issue in the United States in the last decade. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prohibits the recognition of same-sex marriage at the federal level, but a growing number of states and major cities have granted the right to either marry or enter into other officially-recognized relationships.
1 DOMA also allows states to disregard same-sex marriages granted in other states. While state-and local-level recognition can have profound social effects, the economic effects of federal recognition of same-sex marriage are potentially quite important. Changes in this arena are occurring at the federal level -President Obama recently ordered the Justice Department to cease defense of DOMA (Savage 2011) . In this paper, I explore the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on federal income tax revenue.
Same-sex marriage legalization has the direct impact of allowing a change in a household's legal tax filing status, which can change the household's income tax burden, via the "marriage penalty" (which may be positive, a tax, or negative, a subsidy). This change in the tax schedule causes a change in labor supply, which also affects income tax revenue. Further, the desire to capture a marriage subsidy or avoid a marriage tax may cause marriage rates to vary along with the marriage penalty. To fully understand the effect of same-sex marriage legalization on income tax collection, we must understand the distribution of marriage penalties across same-sex households, the causal effect of these penalties on marriage likelihood, and how this change in taxation influences labor supply choices.
To capture both of these effects, I introduce a new measure of the marriage penalty, which I call the endogenous marriage penalty. 2 Changes in the tax schedule upon marriage will change incentives to work for both partners within a household. This in turn changes hours worked and further changes the tax rate. I estimate the marriage penalty 1 These relationships are often called "civil unions", but different constituencies offer legal statuses that provide differing degrees of comparability to the state of marriage. Civil unions are similar to marriage, offering the same legal rights. Other legal statuses offering fewer and weaker legal rights include domestic partnerships or reciprocal/designated beneficiaries (Hawkins 2009, Badgett, Gates and Maisel 2008) . 2 Sjoquist and Walker (1995) have estimated marriage penalties at the aggregate level assuming that labor market choices differ between married and non-married cohabiting couples (finding little evidence of aggregate changes), but I'm not aware of any paper that estimates the behavioral response from microdata.
as a function of rational responses to anticipated changes in both the worker's own tax rate and their partner's, conditional on whether or not the couple is legally married. This endogenous marriage penalty is in contrast to the standard measure, which does not allow for labor market responses to tax changes and as such may be interpreted as an "instantaneous" measure. I provide a decomposition to illustrate the sources of the discrepancy between the instantaneous measure of the marriage penalty and the endogenous measure.
The question of the tax revenue consequences of same-sex marriage is not an idle one. Both the federal and a number of state governments have explicitly justified their same-sex marriage bans on the basis of the adverse tax revenue and expenditure effects (Hawkins 2009 ). In terms of measuring the tax revenue consequences of legalizing samesex marriage, the paper that comes closest to this one is Alm, Badgett, and Whittington The Bush tax cuts implemented a number of reforms, but two primary changes were a general tax cut and a decrease in the average marriage penalty. The JGTRRA in particular served as an exogenous tax shock. The EGTRRA scheduled a slow phase-in of 3 Keifer etȧl(2002) provides a detailed description of the EGTRRA. The JGTRRA grants us the ability to make a number of methodological improvements to the previous literature. While a number of papers (described in section 4.2) have considered the effect of the marriage penalty on marriage likelihood, none to my knowledge have used a single, large, unanticipated cut to identify the effect. In combination with generalized propensity score methods (Hirano and Imbens 2005) , I use the JGTRRA to construct novel estimates of the sensitivity of marriage to taxation. Similarly, while a small number of papers have studied the labor supply of same-sex couples, few have based their estimates on plausibly-exogenous shocks to net wages. 4 Tax data comes from NBER's TAXSIM program (Feenberg and Couts 1993) . These variables include total federal income tax and FICA contributions. Since my tax data is generated by TAXSIM, it is not true taxes paid, but predicted taxes based on observable data within the Census. 6 Potentially important variables not found in the Census include capital gains income and expenditures on child care, health care, mortgage interest and charitable donations. Table 1 describes the characteristics of household members within the sample. When studying household income and specialization, it's useful to differentiate between primary and secondary earners (Antecol and Steinberger 2011) . Most theoretical and empirical 6 These tax-relevant data include the number of children (by age group), labor and business income, interest and dividend income, social security income, pension income, and payments made for rent or property tax. These data are all arguments of the tax function defined in section 3.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
approaches treat the male as the primary earner in heterosexual households. I define the primary earner in homosexual households to be the member whose annual income is greater. In table 1 I separately describe male and female members of heterosexual households and primary and secondary earners in homosexual households.
The sample of gay and lesbian households is slightly younger than the married heterosexual couples, but older than the unmarried heterosexual households. Consistent with Black, Sanders and Taylor (2007), individuals in homosexual households have substantially fewer children and much more education than those in heterosexual households.
Interestingly, in terms of education and wage rates, homosexual households are more specialized (along the dimension of market versus non-market human capital) than are heterosexual husbands and wives. Married men and women have identical average levels of education, and among those who work, married women earn about 71% of their spouse's wages, while gay secondary earners have 0.7 fewer years of education and median wages that are 52% of the primary earners'. 7 The household wage gap is smaller in lesbian households than in gay households, but greater than in married households.
Marriage and taxes
The first step towards estimating the effects of taxes on household status and labor supply is to measure the marriage penalty, which involves calculating actual and counterfactual tax burdens. These calculations allow me to estimate, first, marriage rates as a function of the tax treatment of marriage, and second, the change in the marginal tax rate due to marriage.
In principle, it is simple to define actual and counterfactual taxes, and therefore the marriage penalty. For any pair of individuals (following the notation of Berliant and Rothstein (2003) ), define each individual's income tax liability when single as T s t (y e ), where y e indicates the vector of taxable income streams (and offsetting expenditures and characteristics) for earner e ∈ {1, 2} and where T s t (·) is a function representing the federal tax schedule for unmarried persons in year t. If two individuals marry, the tax liability is T m t (y 1 , y 2 ), where T m t (·, ·) is a function representing the federal tax schedule for married couples in year t. The marriage penalty P is the increase in taxes when a household of two single individuals instantaneously enter into the state of marriage,
Clearly, when P t (y 1 , y 2 ) < 0, there is a negative marriage penalty, or a marriage subsidy. Since the y e vectors are assumed fixed with respect to marital status, this calculation rules out the possibility of economies of household scale, for example in terms of rent or property taxes. Suppose that the first element of y e is labor market income, denoted y L e . Typically, this value is also fixed in equation 1. If so, the measured penalty is best interpreted as an instantaneous change in tax burden among the partners, before any economic responses to the change in martial status can occur.
Given the data in the Census, calculating T m t (y 1 , y 2 ) is simple, since the federal tax schedule pools non-labor income and children within married households. It is less simple to calculate counterfactual taxes for married couples (i.e., as if they were unmarried).
Many assets in married households are pooled, making a clean distinction between each member's non-labor income difficult. Even if the asset holdings of each spouse were clearly delineated, the assets are unlikely to be split according to these divisions in divorce proceedings. Taxes if single are calculated, following the literature, as if a "divorce" and a split of assets occurred, under the assumption that households minimize total tax lability (Feenberg and Rosen 1994) . This method dictates that unmarried couples (whether actual or counterfactually divorced) will equally split all non-work income between the two members.
Children are a major tax deduction, and we must determine which parent is assigned custody of each child when a couple is unmarried. The standard tax-minimization algorithm assigns all child deductions to the higher earner. This implies that the higher earner will take any non-biological children (i.e., the partner's child from a different relationship) into their household after divorce.
8 This is an unappealing assumption, especially among 8 Another popular method for penalty calculations involves assigning children to the woman, as typically occurs in divorce settlements. This procedure provides no guidance, however, for homosexual households. Alm and Whittington (1996) explore the consequences of the opposing methods for allocating tax deductions. They show that while the different methods imply different marriage penalties, the same-sex couples, where there simply cannot be shared biological children. I assign children to parents upon divorce in the following way. Parents always claim a child who is theirs and who is not the biological child of their partner. Shared biological children are assigned to the higher earner. Individuals with no children file as single while individuals with children file as head of household. Figure 1 aggregates across the child groups described in table 2 and shows that there is no substantial time trend in marriage penalties before or after the JGTRRA. For every coresidency type, the fall in the average marriage penalty is on the order of $1000. Figure 2 illustrates that all four coresidency types became more likely to draw a marriage penalty of zero after the JGTRRA (shown in grey) than before (shown in black outline). For all groups, the modal outcome was to pay a small marriage penalty prior to the reforms, and to pay nothing afterwards. Table 2 presents tax liability and marriage penalty statistics, by coresidency, prior to and after the implementation of the JGTRRA. I also separate the statistics by the number of children in the household. Homosexual couples are particularly likely to have no children, and we want to compare them to similar heterosexual couples in this regard.
In terms of changes in actual tax lability, childless gay and lesbian couples experienced the largest average tax cuts of all groups, an average income tax cut of 8.5% for childless lesbian women, 6.1% for childless gay men. Similarly, the majority of heterosexual married couples with children paid a marriage penalty both before and after the reform, while the majority of homosexual couples (regardless of the presence of children) do not.
Treating the marriage penalty as a lump-sum payment as in equation 1 is useful in thinking about the economic incentive to marry. But in terms of labor supply choices, we typically want to know how marginal tax rates will change upon marriage. Here and throughout the paper, when I calculate individual marginal tax rates when married, I assume the primary earner is taxed first, starting at the lower marginal rates. Secondary time trends and year-over-year changes across methods of calculation are virtually identical.
9 I use the term 'coresidency type" to differentiate between individuals living together in heterosexual married, heterosexual unmarried, gay male and lesbian female households.
earners (by definition of being secondary) take the primary earner's income as given and so are taxed as if their first dollar is the primary earner's last dollar. 10 It always holds, then, that for marginal labor income tax rates,
. Among the unmarried, typically
(since the prime earner typically earns more than the secondary earner, though this is not true in all heterosexual unmarried households). Holding constant all other elements of the y e vectors, the more specialized a household is in terms of labor market earnings, the more the prime earner's tax rate will fall upon marriage and the more the secondary earner's will rise upon marriage (Eissa and Hoynes 2000) . The effects of marriage on incentive to work will therefore differ across coresidency and earner type, depending on these factors.
As seen in . These penalties are calculated assuming no labor market response to any tax schedule changes that occur upon marriage.
For every coresidency type, the marginal tax rate for primary earners always falls upon marriage and the rate for secondary earners rises.More interesting are the differences across coresidency types. Since married couples are relatively specialized in terms of labor market effort, married women would pay relatively low tax rates if unmarried and high rates if married. As we'll see again in section 4.1.1, homosexual secondary earners are more similar to unmarried women than to married women in terms of labor market outcomes.
Homosexual rate marriage penalties are significantly lower than married women's, but are statistically indistinguishable from heterosexual unmarried couples. The Bush tax reforms lowered the rate penalties for every coresidency type except unmarried couples, with married women and secondary-earning gay men experiencing the biggest decreases in rate marriage penalties. 10 The labor supply estimation results for married men and women are insensitive to the use of this rate, rather than applying the pooled top marginal rate to both members of the household.
Empirical Results

Labor supply
There is a very large literature studying the effects of taxation on household labor supply choices. The methodology often takes the form of instrumental variables (IV) estimates (Mroz (1987) by coresidency type and primary/secondary worker status in section 4.1.1.
12 Using those estimates, in section 4.1.2 I introduce an alternative measure of the marriage penalty, the "endogenous" penalty, which allows individuals to make optimal labor market responses in response to the shift in tax schedule that occurs upon marriage or divorce.
IV estimates of own-and partner-wage effects
Suppose that the worker's labor supply function is given by the equation
where i indexes households across coresidency types c, earner types (primary or secondary)
e , and time periods t. Letting w measure the net-of-taxes marginal wage, annual hours worked h is a function of (the log of) both the individual's own wage, w o , and their partner's, w p . I ict measures the household's non-labor market income, and X icet is a vector of individual and household characteristics. 12 I use the term 'coresidency type" to differentiate between individuals living together in heterosexual married, heterosexual unmarried, gay male and lesbian female households. 13 In every specification reported, these covariates include indicators for race, Hispanic ethnicity, and time and geographical region indicator variables.
not interpretable as the compensated labor supply elasticity, but instead as the effect of a lifetime wage increase (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999) . All coefficients are allowed to differ across the eight individual types ce.
I do not estimate the labor market participation choice. This is primarily for comparability with the previous literature. For the purposes of estimating tax revenue changes in section 5, this is equivalent to assuming that for the relevant range of policy options, no individual will opt into or out of the labor market due to changes in household taxation stemming from marital choices.
Standard economic theory makes clear that hours worked and wages are endogenously determined, as high-productivity workers will typically work more hours and draw higher Because of the progressivity of the tax schedule, the tax cuts will have a different effect on households of different income levels. I take each partners' birth year and level of terminal education to be shifters of earnings. Both are clearly exogenous with respect to current economic conditions. BDM (1998) suggest (but do not use) the presence of children as a grouping instrument, and the tax code explicitly changed with respect to the treatment of children. While it is unlikely that there was sufficient time to adjust family size in response to the tax cuts between 2003 and 2004, I take the precaution of grouping households by the presence of children aged 2-15 as another demographically exogenous characteristic. It is not possible to bear a child and rear it to two years of age in the 14 In addition, a short time horizon reduces any potential impact of a violation of the "parallel-lines" assumption implicit in the class of instrumental variables estimators that I apply (BDM 1998).
two sample years in response to the policy shock, and since parents are generally legally responsible to rear a child until age 18, it is very difficult to remove a child under age 15 or 16 from the household in response to economic conditions. 15 I create three categories for each of these variables. Allowing group means to differ across time generates 54 (= 3 x 3 x 3 x 2) groups per ce type. Devereaux (2004) points out that in the presence of assortative mating, not only will own-wage be endogenous, but so will partner wage. Both he and Antecol and Steinberger (2011) instrument for both own-and parter-wages. I also will treat partner wages as endogenous, and include a set of 54 indicators for partner type in the vector of instruments, in addition to the own-type indicators.
Since individuals have reservation wages (due to the value of leisure, fixed costs of working, etc), those who draw low wage offers will opt out of the labor force. Low-skill workers will be particularly likely to draw very low offers, causing low-offer individuals and their parters to be omitted from the estimates of equation 2. This tends to bias By and large, primary earners are fairly similar across coresidency type. Own-wage coefficients tend to be small or statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels. The insignificant heterosexual male coefficients suggest an uncompensated ownwage elasticity between 0.02 and 0.05. For gay men, the (also statistically insignificant) elasticity estimates range from 0.005 to -0.08. Children have little influence on labor supply decisions of prime earners. We can never reject the hypothesis that the sensitivity of hours worked to wages (either their own, or their partner's) between married men and 15 This discussion clearly omits the small impact of adoption or child mortality. 16 The bias in α 2 ce for secondary workers and in both log wage coefficients for primary workers is theoretically ambiguous, depending on the effects of productive substitution and complementarity, and assortative mating.
prime-earning homosexuals is equal. Correcting for selection of partners into the labor force reduces our estimates of the sensitivity of labor supply to own-wages and partnerwages among unmarried households, heterosexual and homosexual alike.
The same broad-brush similarly does not hold among secondary earners. There are essentially two types of secondary earners: married women, and everyone else. Consistent with the literature (Mroz 1987, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999) , in every specification, married women have upward-sloping supply curves. Panel C implies an uncompensated own-wage elasticity among working married women of 0.48. Secondary-earner homosexuals and unmarried heterosexual women all behave similarly in terms of labor supply.
Own-and partner-wage coefficients among these groups are the opposite sign as married women's. Statistically, we always reject equivalence of wage effects between secondaryearning homosexuals and married women, and we can not reject equivalence to unmarried women's wage coefficients, except for among lesbian women in panel C. Across all three panels, homosexual secondary earners' hours are very sensitive to partner wages. The higher-private-amenity, higher-cost areas. The rewards to living in a dual-earner households are presumably greater in these areas, and this could drive greater household sorting by ability and greater coordination of labor supply decisions.
Endogenous marriage penalty
Given estimates of hours worked as a function of net-of-taxes wages, we can return to the measurement of the marriage penalty. The standard marriage penalty calculation is instantaneous in the sense of assuming no behavioral response to the shift in tax schedule that occurs upon marriage. Table 3 shows that there are substantial changes in marginal tax rates upon marriage, and so this assumption is rather unappealing. Instead , table 4 tells us that workers will adjust hours in response to changes in the tax schedule. These hours adjustments will change the tax burden, and so will affect the marriage penalty. I describe here an alternate way of calculating the marriage penalty, allowing for endogenous hours response to marriage and divorce, and I calculate the average bias implicit in the standard instantaneous measure.
I use the coefficients from my estimates of equation 2 to predict labor supply given the change in tax schedule. 17 Letting µ be the marginal tax rate, a worker's expected
, where non-labor income is included in the X icet here.
18
A worker's hours choice will change as a function of changes in both her own marginal tax rate and her partner's. The marginal tax rate µ o icet is in turn a function of the hours choice. I predict each worker's hours choice given married and single tax schedules, household wages, the X icet variables, and the value of income tax deductions. Predicted hours imply a marginal tax rate, which in turn give am hours choice. I iterate over this process until marginal tax rates for both household members converge. This generates predicted tax labilities when single and when married.
Denote the predictions of hours under each tax system for each earner to be h e q , where q ∈ (m, s) indicates marital status (and −q implies the counterfactual marital status).
This hours choice implies a gross income y e q and average tax rate τ e q . I show in appendix A.3 that we can state the bias (overstatement) of the instantaneous method relative to 17 I use the Blau and Kahn adjustment to estimate potential wages throughout the paper. All the data used in this section if from the years 2004-2007, under the post-JGTRRA tax system. 18 One way to justify the use of an instantaneous marriage penalty is to assume that hours are a function of gross wages rather than net-of-taxes wages. Since wages are typically assumed to be exogenous to marital status, h icet does not change upon marriage if taxes are excluded from the hours equation.
the endogenous method to be 
where variables without hats represent the observed values in the data, as used in the instantaneous method of calculation.
There are five types of bias described in equation 3. The first term,
, describes the tax rate bias of the instantaneous method: the tax revenue impact of the fact that, because it does not allow workers to adjust labor market choices, the change in the tax rate upon marriage is overstated (evaluated at the observed level of hours worked). The second term, w e (h For secondary earners, the modeling bias is quite large. Since wages and hours are, by construction, much more highly correlated when we model hours as a function of wages, we tend to over-predict hours for high-wage workers and under-predict hours for low-wage workers (illustrating one aspect of why the labor supply behavior of secondary earners is of such perennial research interest (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999) ). This modeling bias is particularly large for heterosexual married couples and gay men, the two highest-earning household types.
The two biases of primary theoretical interest are the tax rate bias and the hours bias. The instantaneous method assumes no hours response to changes in taxation due to entrance or exit into marriage. In terms of tax revenue, for the average heterosexual couple this assumption is not unreasonable. The endogenous method predicts only small average changes in hours worked after changing marital status. The endogenous method predicts
, generating $167 and $283 more in tax revenue from gay and lesbian households, respectively, than predicted by the instantaneous method. This is the largest component of (non-modeling) instantaneous bias for homosexual households. For heterosexual households, the tax rate bias is the largest (non-modeling) contributor to the instantaneous bias. Allowing for endogenous labor market responses, the tax rate when single will be lower, and the tax rate when married higher (since ( τ e m − τ e s ) > (τ e m − τ e s )) than the instantaneous method asserts, contributing $360 to the instantaneous under-prediction of marriage penalties.
Clearly, accounting for the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in the tax structure could have a large impact on our estimates of the tax revenue changes generated by same-sex marriage legalization.
Marriage choice
Very few studies have measured the consequences of the Bush tax cuts on the labor market.
None, to my knowledge, have focused on its consequences in terms of the marriage market.
In terms of labor market effects, Heim (2009) The marriage penalty is not distributed randomly with respect to marital status, and so simple OLS will provide a biased estimate of the effect of taxes on marriage. by the BBCL procedure impose the counterfactual assumption that the distribution of 19 For example, in the standard Becker (1991) model of household formation, partners will choose to specialize in market or non-market production. All else equal, individuals who plan to marry will also a) tend to be more specialized, and b) will have higher-earning primary workers. Each of these facts affects the marriage penalty. P (y 1 , y 2 ) among married household matches the distribution observed among unmarried households. Intuitively, this process places greater weight on the married households that are observably most similar to non-married households in terms of the treatment received. Appendix A.2 describes the precise econometric procedure used to derive the estimates of this section. There are three main conclusions from figure 3. First, the marriage penalty conveys a clear negative treatment effect among childless couples. Imposing the assumption of strict linearity in the treatment effect, the coefficient from regressing predicted marriage outcomes (as predicted via the results reported in table A.2) on the instantaneous marriage penalty is -0.000031 (s.e. = 0.00001). Evaluated at a typical marriage penalty cut of around -$800, this implies an increase in the probability of marriage of three-fifths of a percentage point for a childless couple (from 85.0% to 85.6%). This is a small effect, to be sure, but statistically significant and in line with the previous literature. This estimate is almost identical to that of Alm and Whittington (2003) .
Second, the results are relatively insensitive to whether we use changes in the instantaneous or endogenous measure of the marriage penalty. Among childless couples, the linear treatment effect of the endogenous marriage penalty on marriage likelihood is -0.000045 (s.e. = 0.00001). This at once confirms that past studies of the relationship between taxation and marriage are robust to this new measure of the marriage penalty, while allowing us to apply more economically realistic measures of the tax revenue response to changes in marital status.
Third, among households with children, there is little evidence that unexpected changes in the marriage penalty cause changes in marriage likelihood. Both marriage penalty mea-sures suggest an insignificant negative relationship between marriage and penalties among multi-child households. The instantaneous penalty implies a significantly positive relationship among single-child households (coefficient = 0.000033, s.e. = 0.00001), but the endogenous penalty implies a much smaller, negative, statistically insignificant effect. As the plot illustrates, the positive linear relationship of the instantaneous method comes almost entirely from the very imprecise estimates among low-penalty households. 20 The conservative conclusion is to reject the hypothesis of a consistent treatment effect, positive or negative, in this group.
Consequences of Same-Sex Marriage Legalization
A primary difficulty in estimating the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on federal income tax collection is knowing the marriage rate applicable to homosexual couples.
Previous studies have applied a number of rates. The Williams Institute at UCLA as- There are alternatives to these assumptions. We might assume that marriage likelihood is a function of demographic characteristics and is unrelated to sexual orientation.
I impose this assumption by estimating the likelihood of marriage (among heterosexuals)
via probit regression, as a function of age, terminal education, number of children in the household, and state of residence. Or, we could assume that marriage likelihood among same-sex couples is responsive to the marriage penalty in exactly the same way as it is among heterosexuals: the dose-response functions of figure 3 apply to same-sex couples.
Finally (for the purposes of this paper) we could assume, as does the Williams Institute, 20 Among one-child households, the lower the woman's earnings, the less likely she is to be married. The opposite is true among the childless and multiple child families. Since marriage penalties fall as the secondary earner's income fall (i.e., the tax code rewards specialization and penalizes dual-earners), there is a relatively large pool of high-subsidy unmarried one-child couples, which generates the inverted-U shape of the dose-response function using the instantaneous method. Notice the large confidence intervals around the average marriage likelihood in this group. This relates to the growth of out-of-wedlock births in poor urban areas (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007) . 21 The Williams Institute has released a series of state-level evaluations of the fiscal impact of state-level same-sex marriage legalization, which may be found at http://www2.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute//publications/Policy-Econ-index.html.
that the typical same-sex household has a 50% likelihood of marrying, but that marriage likelihood decreases in the marriage penalty, exactly as in figure 3 . I take the figure 3 marital response functions and decrease them until they have a mean likelihood of 0.5.
Let p i be the probability of marriage, and T q i be the tax lability of household i given marital status q. Given that all same-sex couples are single prior to legalization, the expected change in federal tax liability after legalization is p i (T can not account for the degree to which gay and lesbian will form households based on legalization of same-sex marriage. My preferred results are the estimates based on the endogenous marriage penalty, and using the heterosexual conditional marriage expectation. This measure allows for optimizing agents to respond to the tax system in terms of both marriage and labor supply choice. The mean marriage probability among childless couples (the child-rearing category into which most same-sex couples fall) is around 85%. While this is much higher than the Williams Institute's preferred value, it is below that used by the CBO, and is in line with survey data on expressed willingness-to-marry among same-sex couples (Badgett 2010 These estimates do not incorporate the changes in federal government expenditure that would arise from same-sex marriage legalization. These payments are projected to be small, on the order of $100 million in total annually, split mainly between medicare and social security payments to spouses (CBO 2009) and health care and other partner benefits (CBO 2010). Interestingly, these cost increases almost exactly offset my preferred estimate of the revenue gains, suggesting that the federal legalization of same-sex marriage may be revenue-neutral.
Conclusion
Same-sex marriage legalization is a topic that inspires passionate responses from partisans on all sides. While the politics of the debate are likely to remain hot, it's necessary to have cool economic analysis at hand to understand the costs and benefits of the proposal.
While many people have argued about the financial aspects of the law, I argue that credible economic and statistical identification is hard to find in the literature. I exploit a major exogenous break in the tax code to estimate the labor market response to changes in the tax rate that would accompany same-sex marriage, were it legalized. Using the same tax code shock, I present new evidence on the sensitivity of marriage to taxes among cohabiting couples.
I show that primary and secondary earners in homosexual households make very different labor market choices as a function of net wages. Further, the supply functions of homosexual couples are very different from heterosexual married couples. As such, it is reasonable to assume that homosexual and heterosexual couples' tax burdens might differ after marriage, all else equal. I present a new measure of the marriage penalty, the endogenous penalty, that measures the change in tax burden upon marriage as a function of the optimal labor market choices of both parters across households of different types.
I argue that the most reasonable estimates of the changes in tax revenue upon legalization are in the $100-$175 million range. Including reasonable measures of the additional costs that would come with same-sex marriage legalization, this implies the policy is at least, on net, revenue-neutral, and may generate a small boost to federal governmental coffers.
A Appendix
A.1 Labor Supply Estimation
A.1.1 Grouping instruments I separate families with children aged 2-15 into three groups, those with 0 children, 1 child, or 2 or more children. I use three cohorts, defined by those born 1959 and earlier, those born 1960-1969, and those born 1970 or after. The educational groups are those with a high school diploma or less, those with more than high school but less than a bachelors degree (including college dropouts and those with associates degrees or similar credentials), and those with bachelor's and/or post-baccalaureate degrees. In every specification, I allow group effects to differ before and after the Bush tax (over two time periods t). Interacting the categories, I have 3 x 3 x 3 x 2 = 54 groups. I estimate equation 2 separately by coresidency group and earner type. Denote the vector of these group indicators g ce . Due to the potential presence of assortative mating, in every labor supply regression, I instrument wages using both own-and partner-group indicators.
A.1.2 Selection: re-weighting
I follow the framework of Juhn and Murphy (1997) to implement the re-weighting correction for censoring at the bottom of the wage offer distribution. The idea is that those with low wage offers are likely to have low skill, and therefore would have both low wage offers and low hours worked, if they participated in the market. The people with reported wage data who are most similar to those without reported wages are those from the same group g ce with low hours. I define "low hours" as 1 to 20 hours on the job in the typical week.
I define the number of individuals of each g ce group who did not work as N ). This adjustment factor a g allows households where the secondary earner works low hours (has low skill) to represent both working (non-censored) and non-working (censored) observations. Where ω icet represents the sampling weights and u s ict is the usual weekly hours of work of the secondary earner in each observed household, define the adjusted weights by
This adjustment is applied to both the primary and secondary earner to account for assortative mating or any other relationship between censored observations and observable household characteristics. Juhn and Murphy (1997) argue that this method has the advantage of incorporating the distribution of all observable characteristics into the estimates, as opposed to only using information on mean wages, as done in the wage imputation method described below.
A.1.3 Selection: wage imputation
This procedure follows the discussion in Blau and Kahn (2007) , and is widely applied in the literature. Again start with the set of grouping instruments g ce .
Again assume that those who do not work are "low skilled" and most comparable to workers (of their g ce type) who work low hours (1 ≤ u s ict ≤ 20). Among secondary workers, I estimate the conditional mean of net-of-tax log wages using the equation
where ψ gct is the vector of coefficients associated with group indicators, Z icet is a vector of variables (whose effects are common across g ce types) that shift wages. I include race and geographic region indicators in Z icet , and I allow for the existence of coresidency-groupspecific time trends in wages. I use the parameter estimates from equation A.2 to impute ln w icet to secondary earners without wage data due to zero reported work hours. These conditional mean wages ln w icet are then included (and the households no longer dropped) when I run the labor supply regression, equation 2. These wages are used both as ln(w 
A.2 Marriage Choice Estimation
To estimate marriage choice as a function of the marriage penalty, I apply three corrections to ensure the exogeneity of the marriage penalty with respect to marital status. Following the Hirano and Imbens (2005) model for continuous treatment variables, I estimate the conditional marriage function
where I m is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the individual is married, π represents the treatment variable, the marriage penalty, and p = p(y 1 , y 2 ) is the expected marriage penalty as a function of taxable assets and offsets of each household member, as in equation 1. p(y 1 , y 2 ) is also referred to as the generalized propensity score. My first source of exogeneity is to only use changes in the marriage penalty around the expected level to identify the effects of marriage penalty on marriage. Since "true" marriage penalty π is actually a deterministic function of y 1 and y 2 , it might appear that any differences between π and the our estimate of this generalized propensity score p(y 1 , y 2 ) must come via functional-form misspecifications of p(y 1 , y 2 ). This would be true if the tax schedule were fixed across time, but my second source of exogeneity is the JGTRRA tax reforms of 2003. I estimate the coefficients of the propensity score function based on data from 2002 and 2003 (the time between the EGTRRA and JGTRRA reforms) and then predict p(y 1 , y 2 ) based on y 1 and y 2 data observed in 2003 and 2004 (immediately before and after the JGTRRA). Thus, the primary source of variation in π conditional on p(y 1 , y 2 ) in equation A.3 is the unexpected shock to the tax schedule in tax year 2003. I estimate the propensity score via OLS using quadratic terms in the income of the higher-earner and the earnings gap between household members (see Eissa and Hoynes 2000) , linear terms in non-work income and expenditure variables, and indicator variables for every possible number of children. The propensity score regression results are given in table A.1. Adding higher-order polynomial terms in any variable does not affect explanatory power, R 2 . The results clearly do not capture all the non-linearities of the tax schedule (else, the R 2 would equal 1), but it does explain the great bulk of the determinants of the marriage penalty.
While equation A.3 describes the response of marriage to unexpected changes in the marriage penalty, it does not imply anything about how common each level of treatment is among those who are married and those who are unmarried. In particular, since the Census is purely cross-sectional, individuals who are married tend to be much older, higher-income, and more specialized in the labor market. Each of these factors implies that the married are over-represented among low-penalty households and under-represented among high-penalty households. In order to "balance" the sample in order to create of sample overlap (a necessary condition for identification) and to place appropriate weight on those married households most observably similar to unmarried households, my third correction is to re-weight the data following the method of BBCL (2002 Given sample weights ω icet , the weights applied in the estimation of equation A.3 are ω icet × φ(π ict ). This process balances the sample with respect to the determinants of π, and the tax schedule changes after 2003. BBCL stress that this weight imposes the assumption that the distribution of the treatment (the marriage penalty) among the married matches the distribution among the unmarried. I set φ(π)=0 for households whose marriage penalty is either greater than the maximum observed among the unmarried in 2003, or is lower than the minimum, to enforce a common support of the treatment variable.
The entire process described above allows me to recover the average potential outcome (or "dose-response" function) by predicting the expected marriage outcome over the treatment levels of interest. This dose-response function is given by
where the term inside the brackets on the righthand side is evaluated for each individual, and the expectation over these values is evaluated by local polynomial regression over 50 centiles of the marriage penalty π. Since E(I m (π)) is estimated using generated regressors and parameters, I recover standard errors by bootstrapping the entire process described above 1000 times over 
A.3 Bias of Instantaneous Marriage Penalty
To state the bias of the instantaneous method, I make two assumptions. First, workers do not opt into or out of the labor market due to the marital tax schedule changes. Second, I assume that an individual's (household's) income tax deduction is independent of their level of income, at least on the margin of changes being considered. Wages are also treated as fixed here. Let e ∈ {1, 2} denote the primary and secondary earner, respectively, and q ∈ {m, s} denote martial status (married, single). The instantaneous method assumes that within each household, each individual's hours are fixed at the observed level h e q = h e . Taking wages w e and non-labor income n e as given, write instantaneous gross income in martial state q as y e q = w e h e + n e . Given the average tax rate τ e q , we can calculate the instantaneous marriage penalty
When labor supply choice is allowed to be a function of the marginal tax rate, I write expected hours and income given taxes as h e q and y e q = w e h e q + n e . Acknowledging that the average tax rate is in turn dependent on this endogenous hours choice, τ e q , we can write the endogenous marriage penalty as
The bias of the instantaneous method of measurement is then
One particularly useful way of stating this bias arises by first pulling non-work income out of y e q , and adding and subtracting, for an individual of observed martial status q (and −q representing the other marital status) the terms w e h Note : units are millions of 2004 dollars. Stadard errors are given in parenthesis, generated by taking random draws from U[0,1] to determine who marries, summing the change in annual tax payment, and bootstrapping 1000 repetitions over this measure. The de-biased measure is equal to the endogenous penalty, less the effects of the modeling and counterfactual biases described in table 5. 
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